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I. INTRODUCTION
With enactment of the America Invents Act (AIA), 1 U.S. patent law has
undergone its biggest change since at least 1952. On March 16, 2013, the final
phase of this change was completed by shifting from a “first to invent” to a “first
inventor to file” system. 2 This change is hailed as a large step towards
harmonization of U.S. patent law with those of other jurisdictions in the world.
One of the key terms in § 102 of the post-AIA U.S. patent statute is “or
otherwise available to the public.” 3 This phrase is deceptively familiar to the
European practitioner, because it is reminiscent of the definition of the state of the
art in Article 54 of the European Patent Convention (EPC), which comprises
“everything made available to the public.”4
While the words are very similar, practitioners both in the United States and
elsewhere in the world should not be misled to believe that this similar language
will lead to harmonized treatment of the definition of prior art. This article will
explain what we believe to be the core philosophies that will result in a very
different interpretation of the definition of available prior art.
We predict that the difference in interpretation of this phrase between the
patent offices and courts of Europe and the United States will be profound.
Essentially, Europeans tend to interpret this phrase to mean that the relevant
public has knowledge of the invention itself through the teaching of the prior art.
Under the European view, the focus is on whether the skilled artisan is able to
understand the invention from the prior art disclosure. 5 In contrast, U.S.
practitioners focus instead on whether the object of the invention is in the public
domain, and therefore may be available for use as prior art. 6 The U.S. view
focuses more on the ability to prove whether the disclosure itself can be obtained
by the public. Additionally, under the U.S. system, the skilled artisan is endowed
1

Leahy-Smith Amercia Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
Id. § 3 (stating that the first inventor to file amendments would take effect eighteen months
(Mar. 16, 2013) after the date of enactment of the Act (Sept. 16, 2011)).
3
35 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(1) (West 2012) (“(a) Novelty; prior art—A person shall be entitled to
a patent unless— (1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in
public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention.”).
4
European Patent Convention art. 54(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (as amended Nov.
29, 2000) [hereinafter EPC] (emphasis added), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legaltexts/html/epc/2010/e/ar54.html (“The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made
available to the public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way,
before the date of filing of the European patent application.”).
5
See infra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
6
See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
2
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with an expansive ability to repair or adapt a limited prior art disclosure for use as
an effective reference against a claim.
We will explain the interpretation of the meaning of “available to the public”
by discussing case law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office
(EPO).7 Additionally, we will contrast the views of the EPO with a discussion of
case law of U.S. courts regarding the interpretation of relevant terms of 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 under the previous U.S. patent laws (the 1952 Patent Act) that are also
present in the new 35 U.S.C. § 102 under the AIA.8 From this analysis, we will
paint a possible pathway of how the new term “otherwise available to the public”
might be construed in future decisions of the U.S. Patent Office and courts in the
United States.
II. THE STATUTES
Relevant portions of the EPC and U.S. patent law that are addressed by the
AIA and are of interest for the purpose of this article are reproduced in the table
below.

EPC Art. 549

35 U.S.C. § 102(a)10

(1) An invention shall be considered
NOVELTY; PRIOR
ART.—A
to be new if it does not form part of the person shall be entitled to a patent
state of the art.
unless—
(2) The state of the art shall be held
to comprise everything made available
to the public by means of a written or
oral description, by use, or in any other
way, before the date of filing of the
European patent application.

(1) the claimed invention was
patented, described in a printed
publication, or in public use, on sale, or
otherwise available to the public before
the effective filing date of the claimed
invention.

As can be seen from a comparison of the relevant statutes, both contain the
words “available to the public.”
7

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
9
EPC, supra note 4, art. 54(1), (2) (emphasis added).
10
35 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(1) (West 2012) (emphasis added).
8
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The European novelty requirement begins with the concept that an invention
is new if it is not a part of the state of the art. 11 Paragraph (2) of Article 54 then
defines what constitutes prior art—anything that has been made available to the
public. 12 Accordingly, the novelty assessment at the EPO starts by a
determination of what the prior art is and identification of the relevant portion of
the disclosure. In a second step, a comparison is made between the content of that
art and the invention as claimed. The EPO Boards of Appeal case law that will be
reviewed in some detail below has construed the prior art as being anything made
available to the public as a technical teaching (e.g., a collection of technical
features).13 This interpretation derives from a policy or concept of rewarding new
technical teachings to the world so as to thereby enhance and further technology.
The purpose of EPC Article 54(1) is thus to prevent that which is already a part of
the state of the art from being patented.14
New 35 U.S.C. § 102 under the AIA, although being labeled “novelty and
prior art” does not define prior art per se, but rather begins with the concept that a
person shall be entitled to a patent unless the invention was disclosed under one or
more of recited categories of prior art.15 The categories of “patented, described in
a printed publication, or in public use, on sale” were present in the 1952 Patent
Act.16 However, a large and fairly ambiguous phrase was added to the statute.
“[O]therwise available to the public” was added in the United States as a clause
that modified at least the two previous novelty bars 17 : public use or on sale.
Congressional records do not define this term except to say that the act as a whole
is meant to harmonize the United States with the rest of the world.18
Comments made in the legislative history indicate that the terminology
“patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale” were
apparently chosen for use in the AIA because they were present in the 1952 Act,
11

EPC, supra note 4, art. 54(1).
Id. art. 54(2).
13
See infra Part III.
14
Bayer, [1982] T 0012/81 [E.P.O.], available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-lawappeals/recent/t810012ep1.html; Hoechst, [1985] T 0198/84 [E.P.O.], available at
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t840198ep1.html (citing Bayer).
15
35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2012).
16
Compare 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(1) (West 2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (“A person
shall be entitled to a patent unless— . . . (b) the invention was patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States . . . .”).
17
As will be discussed in detail below, the uniformity of application of the expression
“otherwise available to the public” to interpretation of prior art novelty bars is in question.
18
157 CONG. REC. E1219 (daily ed. June 28, 2011) (extension of remarks of Rep. Smith),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2011-06-28/pdf/CREC-2011-06-28-pt1PgE1219-2.pdf.
12
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and so can be understood in the context of case law. However, at least one
comment managed to jumble the alternative interpretations of the statute in a
single statement, asserting both that the AIA does away with private offers for
sale while at the same time asserting that the public accessibility standard has not
changed.19
The impact of the words “otherwise available to the public” was discussed in
the congressional record as follows:
The words “otherwise available to the public” were added to
section 102(a)(1) during that Congress’s Judiciary Committee
mark up of the bill. The word “otherwise” makes clear that the
preceding clauses describe things that are of the same quality or
nature as the final clause—that is, although different categories of
prior art are listed, all of them are limited to that which makes the
invention “available to the public.” As the committee report notes
at page 9, “the phrase ‘available to the public’ is added to clarify
the broad scope of relevant prior art, as well as to emphasize the
fact that it [i.e., the relevant prior art] must be publicly available.”
In other words, as the report notes, “[p]rior art will be measured
from the filing date of the application and will include all art that
publicly exists prior to the filing date, other than disclosures by the
inventor within one year of filing.”20
By this interpretation, “or otherwise available to the public” should modify the
four listed categories of prior art: patented, described in a printed publication, in
public use, and on sale. Such an interpretation would suggest that “or otherwise
19

Senator Leahy stated:
One of the implications of the point we are making is that subsection 102(a) was
drafted in part to do away with precedent under current law that private offers
for sale or private uses or secret processes practiced in the United States that
result in a product or service that is then made public may be deemed patentdefeating prior art. That will no longer be the case. In effect, the new paragraph
102(a)(1) imposes an overarching requirement for availability to the public, that
is a public disclosure, which will limit paragraph 102(a)(1) prior art to subject
matter meeting the public accessibility standard that is well-settled in current
law, especially case law of the Federal Circuit.

157 CONG. REC. S1496, at S1496 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2011) (emphasis added) (statement of Rep.
Leahy), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2011-03-09/pdf/CREC-2011-03-09pt1-PgS1496.pdf.
20
157 CONG. REC. S1360, at S1370 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting
S. REP. 110-259, at 9 (2008)), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2011-0308/pdf/CREC-2011-03-08-pt1-PgS1360-2.pdf.
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available to the public” does not add a fifth category of prior art to be cited
against a patent claim.
Meanwhile, multiple commentators and even the U.S. Patent Office muddy
the application of this phrase by at times referring to it as a “catch all” phrase that
simply collects any prior art that might not fit in the listed categories of prior art
that are set forth in the statute.21 The Final Guidelines from the U.S. Patent Office
go farther, stating:
AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) provides a “catch-all” provision, which
defines a new additional category of potential prior art not
provided for in pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102. Specifically, a claimed
invention may not be patented if it was “otherwise available to the
public” before its effective filing date. This “catch-all” provision
permits decision makers to focus on whether the disclosure was
“available to the public,” rather than on the means by which the
claimed invention became available to the public or on whether a
disclosure constitutes a “printed publication” or falls within
another category of prior art as defined in AIA 35 U.S.C.
102(a)(1).22
Given this interpretation, the practitioner (and especially the European
practitioner) must consider how this phrase “or otherwise available to the public”
will be deemed to modify the previous understanding of the definition of prior art.

21

American Invents Act Public Forum, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Mar. 15, 2013),
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/FITF_Public_Training_2013mar12.pptx (slide 26); see
e.g., Otherwise Available to the Public, POWER PATENT (Mar. 18, 2013),
http://www.powerpatent.com/blog/725-otherwise-available-to-the-public; First Inventor to File
Patent Takes Effect on March 16, 2013, BLAKELY SOKOLOFF TAYLOR & ZAFMAN LLP (Mar. 13,
2013), http://www.bstz.com/sites/default/files/news/AIA2_March_16_2012.pdf; Jeffery Duncan,
Why Life Sciences Needs to Reassess Their U.S. Patent Strategies, LIFE SCIENCE LEADER,
http://www.lifescienceleader.com/magazine/past-issues3/item/4244-why-life-sciences-needs-toreassess-their-us-patent-strategies?list=n (last visited May 16, 2013); James Morando et al., The
America Invents Act: Key Provisions Affecting Inventors, Patent Owners, Accussed Infringers and
Attorneys,
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/intellectual/roundtables/1111_outline.pdf (last
visited May 16, 2013).
22
Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First Inventor To File Provisions of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,059, 11,075 (Feb. 14, 2013) [hereinafter AIA
Guidelines], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-02-14/pdf/2013-03450.pdf (to
be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
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III. MEANING OF “AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC”
While this phrase is new to U.S. practitioners, the case law of the Boards of
Appeal of the EPO have construed the meaning of “available to the public” in the
context of making a technical teaching available to the public. These decisions
make it clear that, under the EPC, three conditions are important in determining if
a disclosure is available to the public:
1. the relevant disclosure must be available to at least one member of the
public,
2. the disclosure has to actually teach the information to be used in
evaluation of patentability, and
3. the technical teaching of the prior art must be enabled.23
We will examine each of these conditions in light of case law and legislative
history to show how the identification of prior art under the EPC and the AIA will
be significantly different, despite the apparently common language.
A. The Relevant Disclosure Must Be Available to at Least One Member of the
Public
1. Access
There is likely to be agreement between the U.S. and European jurisdictions
over many aspects of the first prong of the above analysis. For example,
remarkably similar rules have developed under both the EPC and the U.S. 1952
Patent Act regarding the timing of when the disclosure is actually available.
Basically, the question about when a journal article, paper, public presentation,
and so forth can be obtained by the public is subject to the same logical analysis.24
23

EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL 69–85 (Legal Research
Serv. for the Boards of Appeal ed., 6th ed. 2010) [hereinafter CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF
APPEAL],
available
at
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/1ae7315e321e933ec12577bd0024d650/$F
ILE/Case_law_of_the_boards_of_appeal_2010_en.pdf.
24
For example, while for typical printed media such as newspapers, journals and, in
particular, patent publications, the date of their public availability can be easily determined from
the mentioned publication date, for other printed matter this may not always be as trivial. This is
the case for printed publications issued by companies such as technical brochures and sales
literature. Id. at 72–73. Often such publications do not bear a clear publication date, or even if they
do, it may not be the actual date at which the publication became accessible to the public. See, e.g.,
Beloit Tech., Inc. v. Voest-Alpine Industrieanlagenbau Gesellschaft m.b.H., [2000] T 0037/96
[E.P.O.], available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t960037eu1.html.
Also, public availability of printed matter may be determined by the date at which the particular
publication is retrievable by a member of the public. Accordingly, in T 0314/99, the Board of

[4:191 2013]

“Made Available to the Public” – Understanding the
Differences of the America Invents Act from the European
Patent Convention in Its Definition of Prior Art

199

2. Confidentiality
Similarly, U.S. and European jurisdictions both treat agreements to keep
information confidential as effective vehicles to preserve the ability to later file
for patent rights. Thus, in Europe, prior use is prior art only if and when the
circumstances of the prior use are such that the subject matter is available to at
least one member of the public in an unrestricted way.25 Information transferred
under conditions of secrecy or similar restrictions, express or implied, typically
prevent the disclosure from being considered to be available to the public.26
An obligation of secrecy does not need to be in writing and can be a tacit
agreement deriving from the particular circumstances. For example, in T 0472/92,
the Board accepted that in the case of a joint venture agreement an understanding
of confidentiality would normally exist between the parties, either expressly or by
implication. 27 In another case related to uranium enrichment technology, the
Board found that the very nature of this technology and project meant that
everyone involved were bound by secrecy.28 Likewise, in T 1076/93 the Board
found that a weapon manufacturer was normally expected to behave as if an
agreement of confidentiality had been specified, presumably because of the nature
of that industry.29
Notably, if unrestricted access to a process is provided to the public, that
process will be considered to be made available to the public even if it cannot be
shown that a visitor actually did receive the relevant information. For example, as
Appeal decided that the availability of a thesis was not the date on which it arrived in the
university library but rather the date on which that thesis was catalogued and thus found when a
search was done. See ExxonMobil Research & Eng’g Co. v. Targor GmbH, [2001] T 0314/99
[E.P.O.], available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t990314eu1.html.
Absent the cataloging, the public had no means to become aware of the thesis and hence it was not
publicly available up to that time. See, e.g., In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899–900 228 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 453 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that a single copy of a thesis cateloged in the university’s
library constitutes sufficient accessibility); Protein Found., Inc., v. Brenner, 260 F. Supp. 519,
520–21, 151 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561 (D.D.C. 1966) (determining that a magazine’s effective prior art
date is the date the publication reaches the addressee).
25
Union Carbide Corp. v. Linde AG, [1991] T 0245/88 [E.P.O.], available at
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t880245eu1.html.
26
Id. (stating that that several vaporizers that had been installed in a fenced-off area of a
shipyard had not been made available to the public as the public did not have unrestricted access
to the relevant area).
27
Sekisui Kaseihin Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., [1996] T 0472/92
[E.P.O.], available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t920472ex1.html.
28
Hareus Quarzglas GmbH & Co. KG v. Nikon Corp., [2000] T 0633/97 [E.P.O.], available
at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t970633eu1.html.
29
Marposs Societa’ per Azioni v. FAG Kugelfischer George Schäfer & Co., [1995] T 1076/93
[E.P.O.], available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t931076eu1.html.
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described in EPO Board decision T 0947/99, an ice cream making process had
become available to the public when the process was shown to visitors at the
manufacturing plant. 30 Three declarations were submitted by the opponent
allegedly showing that the visitors had access to the relevant process details thus
destroying the novelty of the claimed invention.31 Each of the three declarations
additionally stated that there was no explicit or tacit agreement of
confidentiality. 32 The Board reasoned that although they would likely not have
seen each and every detail of the process the visitors could have asked about such
details and would have been given the relevant information. 33 Arriving at its
decision the Board observed:
It appears to be well established in the case law of the boards
of appeal that for a claimed invention to have been “made
available to the public” within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC
before the relevant filing date, information equivalent to the
claimed invention must have been accessible to a skilled person.
As stated by the Enlarged Board in decisions G 2/88 and G 6/88
(OJ EPO 1990, 93 and 114), “the word ‘available’ carries with it
the idea that, for lack of novelty to be found, all the technical
features of the claimed invention in combination must have been
communicated to the public, or laid open for inspection.”34
Similarly, in T 0084/83 a new type of mirror had been fitted to cars for
demonstration purposes during a period of several months prior to the effective
date of the patent. 35 The Board held that this constituted a prior public use
because the mirrors could have been inspected by a member of the public (e.g.,
when they were parked at public locations).36 Whether or not a member of the
public actually did inspect the mirror was irrelevant; the mere possibility of
someone inspecting the mirror was sufficient to satisfy the criterion of “public
availability.”37

30

Unilever PLC, v. Nestec S.A., [2003] T 0947/99 [E.P.O.], available at
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t990947eu1.html.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. (emphasis added).
35
Luchtenberg GmbH, [1983] T 0084/83 [E.P.O.], available at http://www.epo.org/lawpractice/case-law-appeals/recent/t830084du1.html; CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL, supra
note 23, at 74.
36
CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL, supra note 23, at 74.
37
See id.
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The U.S. concept of a novelty destroying disclosure is very similar in both the
protection afforded by confidentiality and whether anyone has to in fact receive
the information. In the United States, once an invention is in the public domain, it
is no longer patentable by anyone. 38 A reference has been made publically
available if such document has been “disseminated or otherwise made available to
the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art
exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.”39
As a long-standing principle of U.S. patent law, once an inventor gives or sells
his or her device to another to be used without limitation or restriction, or
injunction of secrecy, such use is public.40 This is the case even if the use and
knowledge of the use is confined to one person.41 Additionally, once accessibility
of a reference is shown, it is not necessary to show that anyone actually inspected
or understood the reference.42
3. When the Audience is Not Skilled in the Art
Whether or not the audience must be sufficiently skilled in the art is not in
agreement between both jurisdictions. In Europe, an oral presentation,
accompanied by slides, only makes an invention available to the public if a
member of the public would have understood the subject matter.43 In T 1212/97, a
presentation was given, accompanied by slides, but no handouts were provided.44
The Board concluded that since there was not significant proof regarding the
exact content of the lecture or that anyone in the audience could have deduced the
invention from the presentation given the nature of a live lecture being such that
degree of comprehension of the information that is supposedly disclosed (i.e., the
actual communication of information) depends on the manner or speed of the
presentation as much as what is actually said.45 In view of this lack of proof, the

38

See SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1194, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1489 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Application of Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1361, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
670 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
39
Brukelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1684
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 250 F. Supp. 738, 743, 148 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
40
35 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (West 2012).
41
Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881).
42
See In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1314, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
43
Genentech, Inc., v. Bristol-Myers Co., [2001] T 1212/97 [E.P.O.], available at
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t971212eu1.html.
44
Id.
45
Id.
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Board decided that the there was insufficient evidence that the information
content of the lecture was publicly available.46
While it is difficult to predict, it seems likely that a U.S. adjudicator would
focus more on the information content of the slides that were in evidence and less
on whether the invention was understood by the audience.
Similarly, in T 0877/90 the Board determined that since an oral disclosure
took place before a circle of persons, all of who were unable to understand its
technical teachings, the oral disclosure was not considered a public disclosure.47
“[T]he word ‘public’ in Article 54(2) EPC has the same meaning as the words
‘skilled person’ in Article 83 EPC, but whereas in the case of Article 54(2) EPC
the making available to the public of a disclosure is seen form the stand-point of
passive reception . . . .” 48 The decision was affirmed later when the Board of
Appeal determined that a disclosure is made available to the public when the
audience is able to understand and potentially able to further distribute the
information to others—when there is no bar of confidentiality. 49 Again, in T
1212/97 there was no public disclosure because “[n]o instructions were provided
to enable the skilled person to carry out the claimed [invention].”50 The Board
further articulated that “the subject-matter of the claim must be clearly and
unambiguously disclosed in the prior publication, and also in a manner which
enabled the skilled person to carry it out.”51
Under U.S. case law, the main factor is not whether the audience is skilled in
the art. “It is not public knowledge of his invention that precludes the inventor
from obtaining a patent for it, but a public use or sale of it.”52 Older precedent and
U.S. Patent Office Board decisions go further to indicate that the person receiving
the information does not need to understand the significance of the invention, or

46

Id. The court required certainity beyond a reasonable doubt that the particular information
was made available to the public. Id.
47
Hooper Trading Co. N.V. v. Biotest Pharma GmbH, [1992] T 0877/90 [E.P.O.], available
at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t900877eu1.pdf. The court required
certainity beyond a reasonable doubt that the particular information was made available to the
public. Id.
48
Id.
49
Research Found. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Calgene Inc., [2000] T 0838/97 [E.P.O.],
available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t970838eu1.html.
50
Genentech, [2001] T 1212/97 [E.P.O.].
51
Id.
52
TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 970, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (quoting City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 136 (1877))
(referring to the fact that at the time Elizabeth was decided the previous law required that if an
invention was not kept secret one could not obtain a patent).
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even to see the invention that is hidden from view as part of the larger machine.53
Thus, a public use that is not understood by the receiving public was still
considered to be a bar under the 1952 Patent Act.
B. The Disclosure Has to Actually Teach the Information To Be Used in
Evaluation of Patentability
In the United States, the prior art category of “on sale” historically did not
require that the sale be a “teaching” sale.54 Likewise, the concept of forfeiture,
which was established by case law and did not appear in the 1952 Patent Act, did
not require an enabling teaching.55 These categories of prior art are not “teaching”
prior art in the sense of necessarily disclosing the technical features of the
invention.
The EPC again stands in contrast to the U.S. approach. In a key opinion,
“Availability to the Public,” the EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal applied the
concept of prior use of a product and found that any information that could be
derived from the publicly available product without undue burden belonged to the
state of the art. 56 Whether or not there was a particular reason to analyze the
product for the presence of a particular feature was irrelevant.57
In the “Availability to the Public” opinion, the Enlarged Board of Appeal
observed that an essential purpose of any technical teaching is to “enable the
person skilled in the art to manufacture or use a given product by applying such
teaching.”58
Where such teaching results from a product put on the market, the
person skilled in the art will have to rely on his general technical
knowledge to gather all information enabling him to prepare the
said product. Where it is possible for the skilled person to discover
the composition or the internal structure of the product and to
53

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2133.03(a) (8th ed. rev. 8, Aug. 2012) [hereinafter MPEP] (citing
Application of Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779, 783, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289 (C.C.P.A. 1957); Hall v.
Macneale, 107 U.S. 90, 96–97 (1883); Ex parte Kuklo, No. 92-2698, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1387,
1390
(B.P.A.I.
Aug.
31,
1992)),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2133.html.
54
The only two requirements of the on sale bar are that the invention was offered for sale and
it was ready for patenting. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998).
55
Mason v. Hepburn, 13 App. D.C. 86, 95 (1898). Mason is cited by over 200 subsequent
cases.
56
Availability to the Public, [1992] G 1/92 [E.P.O.], available at http://www.epo.org/lawpractice/case-law-appeals/pdf/g920001ex1.pdf.
57
Id.
58
Id.
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reproduce it without undue burden, then both the product and its
composition or internal structure [have been made available to the
public and thus] become the state of the art.59
However, the EPO Board also noted that “a commercially available product
per se does not . . . disclose anything beyond its composition or internal
structure.” 60 Extrinsic characteristics, properties, or capabilities that are only
revealed when the product is exposed to specifically chosen conditions, other than
those of the prior art, are not considered to be disclosed by commercially
available products.61 One of the cases referred to by the Board in its opinion was
G2/88, relating to the use of a known compound for a particular purpose based on
a new technical effect. 62 Such characteristics cannot be considered as already
having been made available to the public, even if those characteristics are
inherent.63 The concept of inherency is alien to the EPC, as will be discussed later
in this article.64
C. The Technical Teaching of the Prior Art Must Be Enabled
1. Enablement Under the EPC
Boards of Appeal of the EPO have consistently interpreted Article 54(2) to
include only reproducible technical teachings as prior art. For example, if a
document discloses a chemical compound by its structure, the particular
compound will only belong to the prior art if the document contains a teaching on
how to make the compound. One of the early decisions of the Boards of Appeal
illustrates this. In T 0206/83, the structure of a chemical compound was disclosed,
as was its method of making.65 However, the document failed to disclose how one
skilled in the art could obtain the starting materials using only his common
general knowledge. 66 It is perhaps noteworthy to point out here that patent
documents can be used under the EPC to establish or prove the state of common

59

Id.
Id.
61
Id.
62
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Chevron Research Co., [1989] G 2/88 [E.P.O.], available at
http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj1990/p093_185.pdf.
63
Id.
64
See infra Part IV.D.3.
65
ICI, [1986] T 0206/83 [E.P.O.], available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-lawappeals/recent/t830206ep1.html.
66
Id.
60
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general knowledge of one skilled in the art only in special or exceptional
circumstances.67
How a teaching in a document is read and understood by one skilled in the art
may significantly change over time. Several decisions of the EPO Boards of
Appeal have held that the relevant point in time to interpret the teaching of a piece
of prior art for purposes of determining whether a reference enables the skilled
artisan to reproduce the invention is the publication date.68 Thus, if a particular
disclosure is found to be non-enabled when read and understood at the time of its
publication based on the knowledge of a skilled artisan, it cannot be used for the
purpose of defeating the novelty of the claimed subject matter.
The American practitioner may start to wonder at this point, how and why this
all matters: if knowledge has become available later, then the particular nonenabling disclosure would render the claimed matter obvious. This, however,
ignores the sometimes-surprising effects of the problem-solution approach that is
a well-established method of assessing inventive step at the EPO. 69 Under the
problem-solution approach, one first identifies the closest prior art and determines
the differences between the invention and the closest art.70 Then, one determines
the technical effect brought about by the difference between the invention and the
closest art, which defines the objective technical problem to be solved.71 Finally,
one examines whether the claimed solution to the objective problem is obvious to
the skilled person in view of the state of the art in general. 72 The U.S. practitioner
has trouble understanding the construction of the objective problem when using
the problem-solution analysis. This is because the objective problem is not the
inventor’s subjective goal, but rather is a problem that is both defined by the
differences between the claims and the prior art and that also is derivable from the

67

Bayer CropScience S.A., [2004] T 0890/02 [E.P.O.], available at http://www.epo.org/lawpractice/case-law-appeals/recent/t020890ep1.html.
68
CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL, supra note 23, at 64 (citing Lenzing
Aktiengesellschaft v. Akzo Faser AG, [1996] T 0590/94 [E.P.O.]; Daiichi Seiyaku Co. v. Henkel
Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien, [1995] T 0965/92 [E.P.O.]; Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft v. G.
Siempelkamp GmbH & Co., [1992] T 0205/91 [E.P.O.]).
69
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN PATENT
OFFICE, pt. c, ch. IV, § 11.5 (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter EPO EXAMINATION GUIDELINES], available
at
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/7ffc755ad943703dc12576f00054cacc/$FI
LE/guidelines_2010_complete_en.pdf.
70
Id. § 11.5.1.
71
Id. § 11.5.2.
72
Id.; see also G. Knesch, Assessing Inventive Step in Examination and Opposition
Proceedings in the EPO, 3 EUR. PAT. CONVENTION, EPI INFO. 95, 95–101 (1994), available at
http://216.92.57.242/downloads/Articles/Knesch-article.pdf.
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prior art. 73 In fact, during European prosecution, the objective problem may
change if it is decided that a different reference is more relevant, and therefore
becomes the closest prior art for the problem-solution analysis.74
As can be taken from the above outline of the problem-solution approach, the
selection of the closest prior art is an important and critical step. It is wellestablished case law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO that the closest prior art
is not necessarily that art which has the most technical features in common with
the claimed invention but rather that art which relates to a similar purpose or
objective. Typically, a defective publication used in an inventive step rejection
will have all the technical features in common but is for a particular reason not
enabling. However, when such a publication relates to a different purpose or
objective, it would likely not qualify as a starting point for the purpose of the
problem-solution approach. Formulation of the problem as one of finding a way
to cure the defect of the publication would then be regarded as an ex-post facto
analysis and not an objectively formulated problem. Likely, the purpose and
objective to which the claimed invention relates would provide technical effects
that are not addressed or foreshadowed in a closest prior art that in addition to
being defective also relates to a different purpose and objective. In other words,
formulating the problem relative to such a reference, as the closest prior art, in
effect amounts to disregarding one or more technical effects and thus to a
technical problem that is incomplete.
Under the problem-solution approach, an inventive step rejection that
identifies a defective (i.e., non-enabling) publication as the closest prior art must
include cure of the defect as part of its objective technical problem. If upon cure
of this objective technical problem there is still a non-trivial difference (technical
effect) between the closest prior art and the claim, it is very difficult to sustain a
rejection based on lack of inventive step. In principle, it is not appropriate to
formulate a technical problem on only one of the technical effects achieved and
ignore any of the other technical effects that have been achieved by the claimed
invention, even if those effects might be seen as inherent once the defect of the
publication has been cured. This makes it more likely that the “defective
publication” will not be the appropriate starting point for analyzing the
patentability of a claim because it may be a disclosure that is not concerned with
the purpose or objective of the patent at issue.
Complications caused by selection of a non-enabling reference as the closest
prior art can be illustrated by the Board’s decision in T 0835/95, relating to glass

73
74

See Knesch, supra note 72, at 96.
See id.
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microspheres.75 The opponent in that case attacked the novelty on the basis of a
document that at the time of its publication did not enable the making of glass
microspheres having the claimed composition.76 When the opponent subsequently
attempted to start from this document as the closest prior art, the Board stated that
the document could not be considered as the closest prior art because it related to
a very different purpose (i.e., laser-induced thermonuclear fusion), whereas the
microspheres of the patent in suit where intended for use as light-weight fillers.77
In essence, the opponent played their “solution card” on curing the defective
publication, and could not bridge the gap between the reference and the patent
claims with regard to the additional technical effects achieved in the context of
microspheres as light-weight fillers.78
2. Enablement Under U.S. Law
In contrast, U.S. patent law allows secondary evidence to demonstrate public
possession. A § 102 rejection may stand even if the reference itself does not teach
one of ordinary skill in the art how to make or use the article because secondary
evidence may be used to close this gap and provide the enabling teaching.79
When the claimed composition or machine is disclosed identically by the
reference, an additional reference may be relied on to show that the primary
reference has an “enabled disclosure.”80 For example, two compound claims were
rejected under § 102(b) over a publication in view of two patents. 81 “The
publication disclosed the claimed compound structure [in a non-enabling manner]
while the [cited] patents taught methods of making compounds of the general
class.”82 The court held that the publication taught all the elements of the claim
75

Minn. Mining & Mfg. v. Asahi Glass Co., [1999] T 0835/95 [E.P.O.], available at
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t950835eu1.html.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
See id.
79
In Re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533, 226 U.S.P.Q. 619, 621 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Such
possession is effected if one of ordinary skill in the art could have combined the publication’s
description of the invention with his won knowledge to make the claimed invention.”); MPEP,
supra note 53, § 2121.01.
80
Application of Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 563, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
(“Additional references cited in a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) are not relied on for a
suggestion or incentive to combine teachings to meet claim limitations (as in a rejection under 35
U.S.C. § 103), but, rather, to show that the claimed subject matter, every material element of
which is disclosed in the primary reference, was in possession of the public.”); In re Donohue, 766
F.2d 531, 533–34 (Fed. Cir. 1985); MPEP, supra note 53, § 2131.01(I) (citing Application of
Samour, 571 F.2d 559; In re Donohue, 766 F.2d. 531).
81
MPEP, supra note 53, § 2131.01.
82
Id.
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and there was no need to provide a specific motivation to combine the publication
with the patents to establish enablement of the publication.83
The U.S. courts go even further and state that a reference is still prior art for
all it teaches, even if it discloses an inoperative device. 84 For the purposes of
determining obviousness, a non-enabling reference may therefore qualify as prior
art.85
IV. SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF PRIOR ART
The answer to the question of whether a disclosure is “available to the public”
begins to get very complicated when considering the categories of prior art,
including the so called “secret” prior art of “on sale,” “forfeiture,” and also the
special case of certain “public use” disclosures.
A. “On sale”
The U.S. 1952 Patent Act states that a sale of a product is a bar to
patentability, and U.S. courts confirm this bar, whether the sale was confidential
or non-confidential. Well-established case law supports the view that once a
product is offered for sale the on sale bar begins. “Any attempt to use it for a
profit, and not by way of experiment . . . would deprive the inventor of his right to
a patent.” 86 There are two conditions that must be met before the on sale bar
applies.87 First, the product itself must be the subject of a commercial offer to sell,
and, second, the invention must be ready for patenting.88 A product is subject to a
commercial offer for sale when the patent owner attempts to “exploit his
discovery competitively.”89 A commercial offer for sale includes both confidential
and non-confidential sales. 90 Additionally, the sale does not even need to be

83

Id.
Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1551, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
85
Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1578, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241
(Fed. Cir. 1991); MPEP supra note 53, § 2121.01(II).
86
City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 137 (1877).
87
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998).
88
Id. at 66.
89
A product is subject to a commercial offer for sale when the patent owner attempts to
“exploit his discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting; he must content himself with
either secrecy, or legal monopoly.” Id. at 68 (quoting Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing &
Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520, 68 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 54 (2d Cir. 1946)).
90
Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1357, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1537 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (“We see no reason why sales for the purpose of the commercial stockpiling of an
invention, even if they took place in secret, should merit different treatment.”).
84
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complete. A mere offer for sale is sufficient.91 In fact, there is no requirement that
the invention actually be in the hands of the customer and therefore available for
reverse engineering.92
Under the AIA, the legislative history indicates that it is the intent of the
statute to remove confidential sales as a basis of rejecting patent applications.93
Therefore, the phrase “otherwise available to the public” is considered to modify
the understanding of the term “on sale.”94 Senator Kyl, one of the bill’s sponsors,
further asserted that the sentence structure of the statute by its use of commas
between the modifying clause “or otherwise available to the public” 95 and
antecedent clauses establishes that the modifier applies to all of the antecedents. 96
The legislative history thus attempts to establish that a public availability standard
is imposed on all of the categories of prior art enumerated by the bill. The U.S.
Patent Office agrees stating that “[t]he ‘or otherwise available to the public’
residual clause . . . indicates that AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) does not cover secret
sales or offers for sale.”97

91

Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“The general rule is that the on-sale bar starts to accrue when a completed invention is offered for
sale.” (citing Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1563, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1210 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
92
J.A. LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 787 F.2d 1577, 1582, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 435
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (“To hold otherwise would mean adding a requirement that goods be ‘on hand’
and transferred at the time of the sale to invoke the bar, a requirement specifically rejected by this
court.” (citing Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Machinery, Ltd., 731 F.2d 831,
836, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
93
157 CONG. REC. S5319, at S5320 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2011-09-06/pdf/CREC-2011-09-06-pt1PgS5319-3.pdf (“Public uses and sales of an invention will remain prior art, but only if they make
the invention available to the public. An inventor’s confidential sale of his invention, his
demonstration of its use to a private group, or a third party’s unrestricted but private use of the
invention will no longer constitute private art. Only the sale or offer for sale of the invention to the
relevant public or its use in a way that makes it publicly accessible will constitute prior art.”).
94
See 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 2012).
95
Id.
96
157 CONG. REC. S1360, at S1370 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2011-03-08/pdf/CREC-2011-03-08-pt1PgS1360-2.pdf (“The word ‘otherwise’ makes clear that the preceding clauses describe things that
are of the same quality or nature as the final clause—that is, although different categories of prior
art are listed, all of them are limited to that which makes the invention ‘available to the public.’”).
97
AIA Guidelines, supra note 22, at 11,075.
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Senator Kyl went on to assert that the understanding of whether an invention
has been made “available to the public” is the same as had been previously carried
out in determining whether a reference was publicly accessible.98
B. Forfeiture
1. Background of Forfeiture in the United States
The concept of forfeiture is that an invention that is used to commercial
advantage more than a year before patent filing is barred from patenting by the
party that used the invention.99 This is a judicially created concept derived from
the principle of preventing inappropriate extension of a monopoly beyond the
statutory term of a patent.100 This is different from the “on sale” bar set forth in
102(b), because the sale of a product produced by a secret process that is not
capable of being reverse engineered is a bar only against the party that took
commercial advantage of the process, and is not a bar against a third party.101
2. Forfeiture Under the AIA
Confusingly, the legislative history instead uses an improper broader
definition of forfeiture, stating that “[t]he present bill’s elimination of the patent
forfeiture doctrines in favor of a general public availability standard also limits
and reconciles the various purposes that previously have been ascribed to section
102’s definition of prior art.”102
Thus, when reading the legislative history, comments with respect to
forfeiture must be read with the understanding that they relate at least to any
manner that a potential patentee could lose patent rights by their own actions.
For purposes of this section, we will use the strict definition of forfeiture as a
judicially created concept derived from the principle of preventing inappropriate
98

157 CONG. REC. at S1370 (“Whether an invention has been made available to the public is
the same inquiry that is undertaken under existing law to determine whether a document has
become publicly accessible, but is conducted in a more generalized manner to account for
disclosures of information that are not in the form of documents.”).
99
Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520, 68
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 54 (2d Cir. 1946) (“[I]t is a condition upon an inventor's right to a patent that he
shall not exploit his discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting; he must content himself
with either secrecy, or legal monopoly.”).
100
Id.
101
W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
303, 310 (Fed. Cir 1983) (“There is no reason or statutory basis, however, on which [one party’s]
secret commercialization of a process, if established, could be held a bar to the grant of a patent to
[a different party] on that process.”).
102
157 CONG. REC. at S1370.
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extension of a monopoly beyond the statutory term of a patent.103 It should be
noted that the question of whether the AIA eliminates strictly defined “forfeiture”
from the U.S. patent landscape is not without some controversy. Law Professor
and blogger Dennis Crouch of PATENTLY-O has noted that the only basis in the
statute for this interpretation is the residual phrase “otherwise available to the
public.”104 As discussed by Mr. Crouch and sources cited in his blog, this phrase
may not be sufficiently explicit language to overrule a United States Supreme
Court decision.105 Eliminating the concept of forfeiture would necessarily entail
overturning the long-standing precedent set by Judge Learned Hand in Metallizing
Engineering, when Judge Hand stated that “it is a condition upon an inventor’s
right to a patent that he shall not exploit his discovery competitively after it is
ready for patenting; he must content himself with either secrecy, or [a patent].”106
The legislative history does bolster the position that the AIA does eliminate
forfeiture as a basis for rejecting a patent application. However, it should be noted
that members of the U.S. Supreme Court indicate that the value of legislative
history that does not directly address a topic is questionable.107 Notably, all major
patent law associations, including the AIPLA, the ABA, and the IPO have taken
the position that the AIA statute does in fact overturn the concept of forfeiture.108
It will ultimately be left to the U.S. courts to decide whether the AIA has
effectively changed this well-established precedent.
3. European View of Forfeiture
Since the governing principle in Europe is that of a public teaching, it comes
as no surprise that the concept of forfeiture as barring patentability is not
recognized by the EPC. Indeed, as is well established within the EPC, as well as
national patent laws of European countries, a secret/non-disclosing use of an
invention does not make the invention “available to the public.”
C. “Public Use”
In the United States, the 1952 Patent Act stated that the public use of a
product more than a year before the filing of the patent application was a bar to
103

See Metallizing Eng’g Co., 153 F.2d at 520.
Dennis Crouch, Did the AIA Eliminate Secret Prior Art?, PATENTLYO (Oct. 10, 2012),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/did-the-aia-eliminate-secret-prior-art.html.
105
Id.
106
See Metallizing Eng’g Co., 153 F.2d at 520.
107
Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Lawyers Cautious when Offering One Specific Piece of
Evidence, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-0422/politics/35452738_1_justice-sonia-sotomayor-legislative-history-lawyers-offer (Justice Scalia,
for one, is notoriously skeptical of its value, stating that “‘examining the entrails of legislative
history’ is a fool’s errand.”).
108
Dennis Crouch, supra note 104.
104
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patentability.109 For example, an improved kaleidoscope was held to be in public
use within the meaning of the 1952 Patent Act § 102(b) because the inventor had
demonstrated the device to several guests at a party in her own home.110 Public
use includes “any use of [the claimed] invention by a person other than the
inventor who is under no limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to the
inventor.” 111 The public use bar furthers patent policy by encouraging prompt
filing and not allowing an inventor to claim things already in the public realm of
knowledge.112 The court considers whether the use was accessible to the public
and whether it was commercially exploited.113 As discussed above in the context
of confidentiality and teaching of the reference, the focus of the public use
analysis has historically been whether or not the information is available, and not
whether the content of the information was understood or even received by
anyone.
1. Experimental Use
Under the 1952 Patent Act, the term “public use” is subject to the common
law rule that “experimental use” is by definition not a public use. 114 City of
Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co. is the case that best articulates the
experimental use exception.115 The case involved Nicholson who invented a new
pavement.116 He laid it in public to see the effects heavily loaded wagons had on
it.117 The court record states that he was there almost daily checking the condition
of the pavement and asking questions to those who used it.118 The court held that
this experimental use is not a public use.119 “So long as he does not voluntarily
allow others to make it and use it, and so long as it is not on sale for general use,
he keeps the invention under his own control, and does not lose his title to a
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35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
Beachcombers, Int’l, Inc. v. Wildewood Creative Products, Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1159–60,
31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 295
F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Petrolite Corp. v. Baker Hughes Inc., 96 F.3d 1423, 1425, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
112
Id. (quoting Allied Colloids Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
113
Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1380, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1741
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
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City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 135 (1877).
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Id.; see also Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1684 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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City of Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 127.
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Id. at 133.
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Id.
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Id. at 134–36.
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patent.” 120 Up until passage of the AIA, this negation of public use is still
recognized more than 100 years later. 121 The policy is to allow an inventor to
perfect his invention before having to file. This allows the invention to conduct
extensive research and obtain a patent even if the research takes place in public.122
The AIA law itself and its legislative history does not discuss experimental
use. The U.S. Patent Office has taken a wait-and-see attitude, stating:
Under pre-AIA case law, the experimental use exception negates a
use that would otherwise defeat patentability. Neither the AIA nor
its legislative history expressly addresses whether the experimental
use exception applies to a public use under AIA 35 U.S.C.
102(a)(1), or to a use that makes the invention available to the
public under the residual clause of AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1).
Because this doctrine arises infrequently before the Office, and is
case-specific when it does arise, the Office will approach this issue
when it arises on the facts presented.123
As discussed above, the legislative history does state that the terms are known
from case law, which suggests that the experimental use exception is intact.124 If
this view holds, one could argue that the phrase “otherwise available to the
public” does not modify the understanding of the term “public use,” in contrast to
the interpretation that “otherwise available to the public” does modify the
understanding of “on sale” as discussed above.
2. EPC View of Experimental Use
The decisions of the EPC do not contain the concept of an “experimental use”
exception to exempt certain uses from the prior art. This can be particularly
troubling for an applicant given the absence of a grace period in the EPC. What is
decisive in establishing, whether a particular use or sale forms part of the state of
the art, is the question whether the use was made available to the public. If the use
was carried out in a way that restricted or imposed confidentiality on those
involved with the use, then the particular use will not form part of the state of the
120

Id. at 135.
As explained in TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971, 220 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 577 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the difference between “exception” and “negation” is not merely
semantic. The burden of proof of is on the party attacking the validity of the patent, and the correct
question to ask is “was the use a public use?”
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Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998).
123
AIA Guidelines, supra note 22, at 11,063 (responding to comment 12 that questioned
whether the experimental use exception to public use would continue under the AIA first inventor
to file provisions).
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H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 57 (2007).
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art. A number of cases of the EPO Boards of Appeal are concerned with
experimental uses and sales where there was no explicit confidentiality agreement
but rather an implicit confidentiality was argued.125
D. Patented or Described in a Printed Publication—Inherency
1. Inherency in the United States
Under the 1952 Patent Act the teaching of a patent or printed publication may
be used for all it fairly discloses, including “inherent disclosures.”126
Under the doctrine of inherency, if an element is not expressly
disclosed in a prior art reference, the reference will still be deemed
to anticipate a subsequent claim if the missing element “is
necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that
it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.”127
This doctrine applies to products sold to the public as well as published
references. Thus, once a product is sold on the market, any invention that is
inherent to the product becomes publicly available prior art and cannot be
patented.
U.S. courts have made it clear that disclosures, either expressly or inherently,
can be prior art references that can anticipate a claim.128 If a reference is silent as
to a claimed feature, extrinsic evidence may be used as a resource so long as the
evidence “make[s] clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present
125

See Tokai Rubber Indus., Ltd. v. Firma Carl Freudenberg, [1994] T 0782/92 [E.P.O.],
available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t920782eu1.html (wherein
the opponent had alleged a public prior use). The public prior use concerned the delivery of fifteen
dampers to Daimler Benz in Stuttgart. Id. In view of the relatively small number of dampers
involved, the Board concluded that delivery of the dampers was intended for experimental or test
purposes. Id. However, as T 0602/91 illustrates, it is not the experimentation per se that
disqualifies a use or test from public availability and thus prior art under the EPC. See CASE LAW
OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL, supra note 23, at 81. The opponents in this case had conducted an
experiment using the patent proprietor’s invention prior to the effective date of the patent without
a confidentiality agreement. Id. It was found that the opponent had a financial interest in
disclosing the invention to the proprietor’s competitor, and so the disclosure qualified as prior art.
Id. at 81–82.
126
See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1342, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
127
Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1380, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1676 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (quoting Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1746 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
128
EMI Grp. N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1350, 60
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1423 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760,
771, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 781 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
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in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by
persons of ordinary skill.”129 Further, “Inherency is not necessarily coterminous
with the knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the art. Artisans of ordinary skill
may not recognize the inherent characteristics or functioning of the prior art.”130
In a specific example, an application for a compound applied to sprouts as a
fungicide is a bar to later patentability of the application of the same compound to
sprouts to achieve a growth regulation effect.131 The second use, even though not
recognized by the skilled artisan as providing a growth regulation effect, was
inherently disclosed.132
2. Inherency Under the AIA
The legislative history of the AIA speaks of the concept of inherency in the
context of the broader concept of “forfeiture.” Specifically, Senator Kyl stated:
Another important aspect of public availability or accessibility
is the doctrine of inherency. “Under the doctrine of inherency, if an
element is not expressly disclosed in a prior art reference, the
reference will still be deemed to anticipate a subsequent claim if
the missing element is necessarily present in the thing described in
the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of
ordinary skill,” a point noted in Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304
F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This doctrine applies to products
sold to the public as well as published references. Thus once a
product is sold on the market, any invention that is inherent to the
product becomes publicly available prior art and cannot be
patented.133
Thus, Senator Kyl asserts that the doctrine of inherency contributes content to
that which is made available to the public in a reference or in a product that is
sold or made publically available. This is a completely contrary position to the
European practitioner’s understanding of what a reference makes “available to the
public.” It is unlikely that a U.S. court would reverse this position and adopt the
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Cont’l Can Co. USA, 948 F.2d at 1268 (citing In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581, 212
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 323 (C.C.P.A. 1981)).
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MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1303 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 136 (Fed. Cir.
1986)).
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See In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1352, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1202
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
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See id.
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157 CONG. REC. S1360, at 1370 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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European approach even though the words of the statutes of these jurisdictions in
this aspect are substantially identical.
3. Inherency in Europe
Probably one of the most significant and fundamental differences in
interpretations by courts in the United States and the Boards of Appeal of the EPO
in the determination of what a disclosure teaches to one skilled in the art is the
doctrine of inherency. EPO decisions have held that the doctrine of inherency is
not compatible with the requirement of “availabil[ity] to the public” in Article
54(2) EPC. 134 In a number of decisions, the Enlarged Boards of Appeal
deliberated on the use of claims whose limitation lies solely in the stated purpose.
The now well-established claim format at the EPO reads as “use of compound X
for the purpose Y.”135 The Board observed: “[W]here a particular technical effect
which underlies such use is described in the patent, . . . the proper interpretation
of the claim will require that a functional feature should be implied into the claim,
as a technical feature; for example, that the compound actually achieves the
particular effect.”136
The Enlarged Board applied this principle to a case having a second
nonmedical use claim.137 The claim read: “Use of (certain compounds) . . . for
controlling fungi and for preventive fungus control.” 138 The relevant prior art
disclosed the same compounds in a context of plant growth regulation. 139 The
Examining Division in the appealed decision had rejected the claim for lack of
novelty, apparently on the basis that the process of carrying out the invention was
the same in the prior art document, and so the claimed effect (outcome)
underlying the use of the compound for fungus control must have been achieved
in the treatment described in the document.140 In other words, the technical effect
underlying the purpose limitation of the claim was inherently achieved by
carrying out the prior art process. In its decision, the Enlarged Board of Appeal
stated:
Under the EPC, a hidden or secret use, because it has not been
made available to the public, is not a ground of objection to
134

Mobil Oil Corp., [1989] G 2/88 [E.P.O.], OFFICIAL JOURNAL EPO (Dec. 11, 1989),
available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj1990/p093_185.pdf (Decisions of the Enlarged
Board of Appeal).
135
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 109 (alteration in original).
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Id.
140
Id. at 109–10.
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validity of a European patent. In this respect, the provisions of the
EPC may differ from the previous national laws of some
Contracting States, and even from the current national laws of
some non-Contracting States. Thus, the question of “inherency”
does not arise as such under Article 54 EPC.141
It deserves mention here that the rejection of the application of the doctrine of
inherency by the EPO has implications reaching well beyond the question of
novelty. This difference in the permitted scope of availability of a given prior art
reference as determined by what it is deemed to “make available to the public” is
a key factor that may lead to a finding of inventive step in the EPO, whereas
under the same set of facts, giving due consideration to what the disclosure
“inherently” teaches, U.S. courts may arrive at a finding of obviousness.
V. CONCLUSION
The AIA does not achieve one of the expressly desired goals of harmonization
of U.S. patent law with the patent laws of the rest of the world, even though it
introduces a phrase that is familiar to European practitioners. This is, on the one
hand, because the definition and core philosophy of the concept of what is
appropriately available as prior art is fundamentally different. However, as the
above comparison of various case law in the respective jurisdictions show, the
term “available to the public” found in both the AIA and the EPC will likely be
interpreted in a very different way by U.S. courts compared to the Boards of
Appeal at the EPO.
While certain categories of prior art will no longer be available for citation in
the United States because of the new phrase “otherwise available to the public,”
such as confidential sales and secret prior art processes, other categories will
likely not be disturbed. It does not appear conceivable that U.S. courts would
disregard a whole body of case law pertaining to the pre-AIA law related to
inherency or experimental use without clear repudiation in the plain language of
the AIA. It is even less likely that U.S. courts will consider interpretation given to
the similar terms by tribunals in a foreign jurisdiction. Rather, it is to be expected
that U.S. courts will attempt to reconcile the pre-AIA case law with the new law.
There is ample opportunity for the courts to do so because terms in 35 U.S.C. §
102 of the 1952 Patent Act142 also appear in the new 35 U.S.C. § 102 under the
AIA.143
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We must conclude that the similarity of prior art definitions between U.S. law
and that of the EPC will stop at the similarity of the phrase “otherwise available to
the public.” Harmonization of the evaluation of availability of many types of
disclosures as prior art in the United States as compared to Europe has likely not
been achieved by the AIA. On reflection, this is not surprising, given that years of
harmonization of patent law in Europe have not achieved harmonization to the
extent that the outcome of a particular case in one country is also the outcome in
another country.144 It would be an illusion to think that the amendments to the
AIA would achieve such harmonization.
We are concerned that the new phrase in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) may lead some
practitioners, in particular, the European practitioner, to a false sense of security
in understanding the AIA. It is to be expected that the term “available to the
public” will have a significantly different interpretation in U.S. courts, as
compared to how this term is typically interpreted in the EPO. It is the hope of the
authors that this article will aid in avoiding confusion among practitioners on both
sides of the Atlantic.
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See David Perkins & Garry Mills, Patent Infringement and Forum Shopping in the
European Union, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 549, 549–50 (1996) (discussing forum shopping and in
particular the famous Epilady cases).

